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1 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence

SUBJECT: General Carroll's View on Joint CIA-DIA Memorandum

1. We understand that General Carroll feels the most critical problem of verification—the ability to detect activity that the Soviets will attempt to conceal—has been relegated to second place in both the SNIE and in the CIA—DIA memoran—dum under consideration. We are told this also reflects General Wheeler's views. General Carroll probably will raise this as a general point to provoke some USIB discussion. This view is also at the root of his problems with specific sections of the joint memorandum. These are as follows:

a. Page 2, paragraph 4, first sentence:

General Carroll will suggest something like the following substitute wording--

"In general, the quantities which we have expressed in reply to the questions are numbers which we believe would enable us to have a considerably better than even chance of detection determining that a violation of the agreement had occurred. Nevertheless, we would not be able to determine the extent of the violation. (Remainder of paragraph to remain the same).

## OSR Comment:

The quantities expressed in the reply are quite independent of numbers or levels which might be included in an agreement. They should not, therefore, be linked to "violation of the agreement."

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## b. Page 3, Reply to Question 1:

General Carroll would like to have this reply directed more to the question of detectability under concealment. Under such conditions he does not feel that the numbers or the time period would be as we have stated them. He thinks there should also be a discussion of support facilities required for a mobile ABM system, similar to the way this is handled in the reply to question 3. He feels that paragraph 10 addresses the most important problem, and should be more prominent.

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